Can the facts of UK inflation persistence be explained by

nominal rigidity? by Meenagh, David et al.
Cardiff Economics
Working Papers
David Meenagh, Patrick Minford, Eric Nowell,
Prakriti Sofat and Naveen Srinivasan
Can the Facts of UK Inflation Persistence be Explained by
Nominal Rigidity?
E2008/7
CARDIFF BUSINESS SCHOOL
WORKING PAPER SERIES
This working paper is produced for discussion purpose only. These working papers are expected to be published in
due course, in revised form, and should not be quoted or cited without the authors written permission.
Cardiff Economics Working Papers are available online from: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/carbs/econ/workingpapers
Enquiries: EconWP@cardiff.ac.uk
ISSN 1749-6101
April 2008, updated April 2010
Cardiff Business School
Cardiff University
Colum Drive
Cardiff CF10 3EU
United Kingdom
t: +44 (0)29 2087 4000
f: +44 (0)29 2087 4419
www.cardiff.ac.uk/carbs
Can the facts of UK ination persistence be explained by
nominal rigidity?
David Meenagh
Cardi¤ University
Patrick Minfordy
Cardi¤ University, CEPR
Eric Nowell
Liverpool University
Prakriti Sofat
HSBC
Naveen Srinivasan
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
January 2009
Abstract
It has been widely argued that ination persistence since WWII has been widespread and durable
and that it can only be accounted for by models with a high degree of nominal rigidity. We examine
UK post-war data where after conrming previous studiesndings of varying persistence due to
changing monetary regimes, we nd that models with little nominal rigidity are best equipped to
explain it.
Keywords: ination persistence, New Keynesian, New Classical, nominal rigidity, monetary
regime shifts
JEL Classication: E31, E37
We thank for helpful comments two anonymous referees, John Dri¢ ll, Max Gillman, Marcus Miller, Ken Wallis, and
other participants in the Cardi¤ University economics workshops, the Reading University seminar and the ESRC World
Economy and Finance 2007 Conference. We also thank Zhongjun Qu and Pierre Perron for the use of their code to test
for structural breaks; and Bruce Webb for assistance with some computations. This work was supported by the UKs
Economic and Social Research Council under grant number RES-165-25-0020.
yCorresponding Author: Patrick Minford, Cardi¤ Business School, Cardi¤ University, Colum Drive, Cardi¤, CF10 3EU,
UK. Tel: +44 (0)29 20875728. Email: Patrick.Minford@btinternet.com
1
The object of this paper is to ask: how much nominal rigidity does a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model of the open economy require to account for the ination persistence we
observe in UK data? To do this we rst review the facts of UK ination persistence which have been
extensively documented, and nd an acceptable time series representation of them. Second we set out the
DSGE model with varying degrees of nominal rigidity giving us several alternative versions of it. Finally,
we examine how far these various versions of the model can account for the time series representation,
using the method of indirect inference; we can then evaluate and rank the success of the various versions
in order to answer our question.
1 Related literature
Ination persistence has been widely noted in the post-war period. Together with other facts of macroeco-
nomic behaviour, notably output persistence, it has motivated the search for dynamic general equilibrium
models that could account for such persistence. At the heart of models of this sort in current widespread
use is nominal rigidity, or price and ination stickiness, often modelled by contracts of the sort suggested
by Calvo (1983) with a backward-looking element due to indexation (or in some versions rule of thumb
behaviour by price setters unable to set their prices optimally). DSGE models with such a Phillips Curve
are exemplied by Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003); they have been dubbed New
Keynesianor New NeoKeynesian Synthesismodels. According to this line of theorising ination per-
sistence can be thought of as largely engineered intothe structure of the economy by the specication of
the Phillips Curve itself. It should therefore be expected to be fairly constant with little e¤ect from any
changes in monetary regime. By contrast there is an alternative line of theorising going back to Lucas
(1976) that would argue di¤erently. On this view, ination persistence is nal formbehaviour reecting
the joint behaviour of forcing (error and other exogenous) processes that have natural persistence, a
DSGE model with perhaps limited or even no nominal rigidity, and a monetary regime that may vary
with political choices and perceptions. This nal form behaviour will vary with regime and will not
necessarily generate high persistence in all regimes (West, 1988; Ireland, 2003b).
This di¤erence of approach has spawned a large body of empirical work examining the joint facts
of ination persistence and regime shift. Results have varied widely partly because of the di¢ culty of
pinning down the nature and frequency of regime shifts; in general the more frequent the shifts, the
more variable and the lower the persistence found. For the US Pivetta and Reis (2007) show that one
can nd a case in the univariate ination data alone for there being constancy of ination persistence
from the 1960s to the present day; thus one cannot reject the null of constancy. Equally they agree that
one cannot reject the null of a moderate decline as found by Cogley and Sargent (2002). For the UK a
variety of studies have created a consensus that persistence has varied with changes in monetary regime
(Batini, 2006, Benati, 2004, Boero, Smith and Wallis, 2009).
From the DSGE side there has also been much work on testing the capacity of various models to
mimic among other things the facts of ination persistence, in the form of the impulse response function
of monetary and other shocks on ination  for example again Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and
Wouters (2003). At this stage the consensus favours the DSGE models with a fair degree of built-in
rigidity. Varied microeconomic interpretations have been proposed as the source of this. Roberts (1998),
Ball (2000), Ireland (2000), Mankiw and Reis (2002), Sims (2001) and Woodford (2001) assume that
private agents face information-processing constraints. Buiter and Jewitt (1981), Fuhrer and Moore
(1995), Fuhrer (2000), Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof (2001), Smets and Wouters (2003), and Christiano et
al. (2005) assume that high ination persistence results from the structure of nominal contracts. Others
like Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland (2001) and Ireland (2003a) generate
the persistence through the data generating processes of the structural shocks hitting the economy.
In particular, most attention has inevitably been paid to the main samples of data used rather than
asking whether the models are robust across subsamples. An interesting question that has been largely
uninvestigated is whether these models can pick up changes in the impulse response functions that could
have been triggered by shifts in monetary regime.
It would clearly be most helpful for the investigation of these issues if one could achieve a reasonable
agreement on what monetary regimes were in existence and when. Then one could separate the data into
the relevant subsamples and estimate time-invariant time-series processes for each, thus establishing the
facts of ination persistence in each episode. Then also one could modify various contending versions of
an appropriate DSGE model and test which of these versions could best account for the facts of each
episode. This should enable one to answer the questions; which model version can best explain ination
persistence and are there model versions that cannot explain it at all? While there will still be many
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other facts that one would like such models to explain and therefore many further fences for these models
to fall at, at least we could have made some progress, in a Popperian way (Popper, 1934), in removing
some model versions from contention in so far as they fail over ination persistence.
It turns out that UK data is an answer to this implicit prayer. Whereas it has proved hard to
reach agreement on what monetary regimes were in place in the US and indeed whether there was ever
any change at all (except briey at the start of the 1980s with the experiment in the control of bank
reserves), for the UK there have been several well-documented changes in monetary regime. Furthermore
it is possible, as we will show, to back up the massive documentary evidence econometrically.
Thus in this paper we focus on the phenomenon of ination persistence in the UK over the post-war
period; our aim is to use it to test DSGE models with di¤ering degrees of nominal rigidity. We begin with
the facts of regime change, the sine qua non of our methods here. We review the shifts between xed
and oating exchange rates and within the latter between di¤erent sorts of monetary and other methods
of ination control. We test our documented split of regimes using a method recently suggested by Qu
and Perron (2007) and we nd reasonable support for our proposed splits. We are then able to proceed
to the next stage which is to estimate the facts of ination persistence in each episode; we proceed as
simply as possible, estimating a parsimonious univariate ARMA for each. As one would expect in such
subsamples the ination process is clearly stationary (a main reason for nonstationarity is after all regime
shift); furthermore we know from the DSGE models we set up that the nal form of the ination process
will be an ARMA of nite order. We then use the parameters of this ARMA and its implied impulse
response function to assess the degree of persistence.
We then turn to the question of how much nominal stickiness is needed to account for the persistence
revealed in each episode. We take a standard DSGE model of the open economy with exogenous capital
and inject into it di¤erent degrees of nominal rigidity; we follow the widely-used procedure of taking a
stripped downmodel, where the Euler equations are converted into a forward-looking IS curve, and the
remainder of the model consists of the equations for the monetary or other ination-control regime in
place together with the Phillips Curve (and its varying degree of nominal rigidity). We test our di¤erent
model versions by asking whether each in turn could have generated the patterns of persistence we nd
in the actual data. To do this we generate the sampling variability within the model under each regime
by the method of bootstrapping the models estimated residuals; this permits us to nd the statistical
distribution of the ARMA parameters in the ination regression under the null hypothesis of each model
and thus to reject or accept each model. We can also compare the impulse response functions we nd in
the data with the 95% bounds generated by each model; this test essentially replicates the other one in
a more transparent way.
To anticipate our conclusions, rst we do not nd that ination persistence is a stylised constant; it
appears largely to disappear at various points in the post-war UK, notably most recently; this favours
the view that this is indeed connected to several changes in monetary regime, with di¤erent regimes
exhibiting very di¤erent degrees of persistence. Second, we nd that while high ination stickiness can
account best for some regimes and low stickiness best for others, the best overall model across all regimes
is one with minimum stickiness.
In section 2 therefore we estimate ARMA models for UK data in the various post-war regimes we
identify. In section 3 we set out our various models for each monetary regime, calibrate and t them to
the data, to nd the implied model errors later to be used in bootstrapping. In section 4 we carry out
the bootstrap tests of the models. Section 5 concludes.
2 Estimating UK ination persistence under changing regimes
Persistence denes the extent to which the e¤ect of a shock persists both in terms of size and length of
time; for ination this e¤ect should be positive, as negative persistence is typically thought of as extreme
non-persistence. For a univariate time-series there is no unambiguous scalar measure  see Pivetta and
Reis (2007), Phillips (1991), Andrews (1993), Andrews and Chen (2004), Marques (1994), Murray and
Papell (2002), Rossi (2001), Hamilton (1994). Matters can be simplied somewhat by assuming an AR
process in which case frequently used measures include the sum of the coe¢ cients, the largest root, or
the half life (the number of periods for which ination remains above 0.5 for a unit shock). For an
ARMA as assumed here the rst two are inappropriate because they ignore the MA coe¢ cients. As
we will see below, little hinges on the precise measure used since the impulse response functions (IRFs)
estimated are highly transparent and therefore do not require summarising. For completeness we report
as summary measures both the half-life and the nearest AR(1) approximation to the IRF.
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Over the past decade we have observed substantial shifts in the monetary policy of a number of
countries, particularly the widespread adoption of explicit ination targets. There is a growing body
of research supporting the view that the monetary regime in place has an impact on the persistence
properties of ination  see Brainard and Perry (2000), Taylor (2000) and Kim, Nelson and Piger
(2001), Ravenna (2000), Benati (2002) and Levin & Piger (2003).
For the UK in particular, several authors have examined the many shifts in monetary regimes that
have occurred  including Nelson (2001), Nelson and Nikolov (2004) and Nelson (2007). For the period as
a whole, there have been large swings both in ination and economic growth. Ination was continuously
in double digits during most of the 1970s, and returned there in the early 1980s and 1990s. However,
like the US from the mid-1980s, the UK experienced a great moderationfrom 1992.
Plainly, the question of regime breaks is of the utmost importance for our subsequent analysis. Our
regime identication is supported by a wealth of narrative evidence (Annex B). Thus the break-up of
Bretton Woods (our rst regime) and the UKs shift into oating in 1972 is a matter of historical record.
There followed what we call the incomes policy regime, marked by a monetary and scal policy that
responded almost exclusively to the levels of output and unemployment; ination was controlled through
episodes of wage/price controls and we model the ination process directly as a product of these1 . This
period ends in 1979 with the election of a Conservative government committed to monetary targeting.
It was clearly not a sustainable regime in the normal sense since it lacked any monetary anchoring of
ination. Since it is not a monetary regime, our models shed no light on it and we will therefore disregard
it in our tests of them.
The introduction of monetary targeting in 1979 followed political controversy over the control of
ination. Though the Labour government of James Callaghan had introduced monetary targets in 1976,
they were implemented with the help of direct controls on bank deposits and accompanied by wage/price
controls because of a lack of faith in the monetary framework among leading Labour ministers. The
Conservatives by contrast opposed the use of wage/price controls because they distorted market forces
and were in their view ine¤ective in the long-term control of ination. Hence the old regime relied on
those controls whereas the new regime from 1979 relied exclusively on monetary policy.
The period of exchange rate targetingfrom 1986 until the 1992 exit from the Exchange Rate Mech-
anism of the European Monetary System (the ERM) is also well documented. During this period there
was disagreement between ministers on how monetary policy should be conducted but informally the
Treasury installed an exchange rate target to guide its setting of interest rates  a prodecure known as
shadowing the Deutschemark. After the fall of Margaret Thatcher from o¢ ce in late 1990, the pound
formally entered the ERM.
In September 1992 the pound left the ERM under the speculative attack of Black Wednesday. Over
the next few months the Treasury and the Bank of England decided to institute the  at that stage
relatively new  monetary framework of ination targeting that had been pioneered by New Zealand.
As part of this framework the Bank was made publicly co-responsible for the setting of interest rates
and was to publish a regular Ination Report. Later, when Labour came to power in 1997, the Bank was
given sole responsibility for setting interest rates but the framework was otherwise largely unchanged.
Thus we treat the whole period from 1992 as a single ination targeting regime.
Though the narrative evidence is fairly clear-cut, it could be questioned whether there was statistical
evidence from the macro time-series supporting the existence of these regime breaks. For this purpose
we look at the evidence from the three endogenous macro variables identied in our models: output,
ination and the short-term interest rate. We estimate a VAR in the stationarised values of each viz,
log(output), ination and (interest rate). Using the method of Qu and Perron (2007), we split
the sample into three overlapping 20-year sub-samples that each contain two breaks according to our
narrative analysis; this split was for computational reasons as running the whole sample in one proved
to be too computationally burdensome for the programme to solve. The sub-samples were 196585;
197595 and 19852003. We looked for breaks in both parameters and covariance matrices, with no limit
on the number of breaks to be identied. The results are reported in Table 1 which shows when each
regime ends and the 95% condence interval.
These tests generally conrm the existence of the assumed breaks and place them reasonably close to
the assumed break date.2 They place the end of regimes rather later than we have assumed, in all cases.
1 It is therefore determinate, even if plainly wage/price controls are unsustainable and duly ended in 1979. Clarida
et al (2000) suggest for the US that before 1979 a highly accommodative Taylor Rule operated, but such a rule gives an
indeterminate solution for ination. We leave the interesting issue of how exactly to model this regime in terms of monetary
(and also scal) policy to later work. Here we e¤ectively omit this regime in our comparison of models.
2Benati (2004) nds a similar set of breakpoints using univariate processes for several macro variables as well as frequency
domain estimates. The main exception is that we nd an additional breakpoint within the 1980-1992 period corresponding
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Assumed end Estimated 95% Condence Interval
of regime Lower Upper
Bretton Woods (1965-85) 1970Q4 1972Q1 1971Q4 1975Q1
Incomes Policy (1965-85) 1978Q4 1981Q2 1977Q4 1981Q3
(1975-95) 1978Q4 1979Q2 1978Q1 1979Q4
Money Targeting (1975-95) 1985Q4 1990Q1 1988Q2 1990Q2
(1985-2003) 1985Q4 1990Q1 1989Q4 1990Q2
Exchange Rate (1985-2003) 1992Q3 1993Q4 1992Q4 1994Q2
Targeting
Table 1: Qu-Perron Structural Break Test
For Incomes Policy the date lies within the 95% condence interval and for Exchange Rate Targeting it
is within a couple of quarters of it. The main one where the evidence disagrees materially is on the break
between Monetary Targeting and Exchange Rate Targeting where it puts it in 19881990 against the
end of 1985 as assumed here. Thus it conrms the existence of a break from Monetary to Exchange Rate
targeting but puts it two years later. Since Ination targeting starts soon after, this would imply that the
Exchange rate targeting regime was rather brief, e¤ectively conned to the period of formal membership
of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. On this particular point we decided to allow the narrative evidence to
stretch the Exchange Rate targeting sample to include the previous couple of years where there is known
to have been shadowingof the ERM, with an expressed target for the sterling-deutschemark rate. In
defence of this procedure we would say that when policy regimes change there may well be a lag before
agentsbehaviour changes; this lag will be the longer when the regime change is not clearly communicated
or its e¤ects are not clearly understood. A reasonable case can be made that both with the introduction
of both Exchange Rate Targeting and Ination Targeting this was the case. With the rst the switch in
policy was deliberately kept unannounced by the Treasury to conceal it from other parts of government
(notably 10 Downing Street) which remained attached to Monetary Targeting. With Ination Targeting
the issue was more the sheer unfamiliarity of the regime; only New Zealand had previously adopted it.
However we do look at the alternative break points suggested by the Qu-Perron tests (Annex C3) as part
of our robustness checks; we nd that though particular results change they do not a¤ect our conclusions.
Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviation of ination for the di¤erent regimes (annualised
quarterly rates of change, in fractions per annum).
Regime Mean Standard Deviation
Bretton Woods (FUS) 0:036518 0:033962
Incomes Policy (IP) 0:134800 0:081785
Money Targeting (MT) 0:095506 0:073607
Exchange Rate Targeting (FGR) 0:057422 0:042047
Ination Targeting (IT) 0:024982 0:025131
Full Sample 0:062063 0:064810
Table 2: Summary statistics of ination (annualised quarterly rates, fractions per annum)
The high water mark of ination both in mean and variance was the Incomes Policy period of the
1970s. This followed the relatively tranquil period of Bretton Woods; and it was in turn followed by
the period of Monetary Targeting when ination was brought down dramatically. During the Exchange
Rate Targeting regime it fell further; this was a period containing a severe recession also. At its end
there again followed a period of relative tranquility, under the new Ination Targeting regime.
The best-tting ARMA equation for each regime was chosen under the criterion of parsimony. All
regressions also contained a constant and three seasonal dummies. (Notice that Boero et al., 2007, found
no evidence of moving variance within similar sub-periods to ours.) Starting with ARMA(1,0) we rst
raised the order of MA by one and then that of the AR by one, and so on upwards, each time doing an F-
test to test (at 99%) whether the more parsimonious model was a valid restriction. The order was raised
only if we reject the null hypothesis of a valid restriction. Parsimony increases the power of our tests
across DSGE models, possibly at the expense of bias in the estimates of the IRF shape. A further issue
that could be raised is our decision to use the quarterly rather than the year-on-year change in prices to
to exchange rate targeting.
3The annexes can be found at http://www.cf.ac.uk/carbs/faculty/minfordp/
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model the ination time-series; sampling error (Shoemaker, 2006) could produce more persistence than
could be accounted for by the MA structure in the annual than in the quarterly rate. To check on these
issues, we repeated our procedures using time-series forms chosen by Boero et al. (2009) for both annual
and quarterly changes  Annex C, last section. We found no evidence in UK data of the Shoemaker
e¤ect; and we also found that our results were robust to Boero et als quarterly specication  discussed
further below.
The F tests can be seen in Table 34 , the resulting parameters in Table 4: and the IRFs in Figure 1.
In all cases the ARMA was of maximum order two, while in three cases we selected AR(1).
F-Test for Restriction
* F-test signicant+ FUS IP MT+ FGR IT
ARMA(1,0)!ARMA(1,1) 6:862936 0:681275 19:298391 0:003338 0:693967
ARMA(1,0)!ARMA(2,0) 1:282354 0:749222 7:106008 0:013357 0:332882
ARMA(2,0)!ARMA(2,1) 0:103106
Table 3: F-Tests to Find Best-Fitting ARMA
Di¤erent Monetary Regimes
FUS IP MT FGR IT
AR(1)
 0:592304
(0:138349)
0:727366
(0:133271)
0:927892
(0:038179)
0:623726
(0:164163)
0:202142
(0:155071)
MA(1)
0:952206
(0:066378)
 0:997381
(0:056533)
R2 0:352409 0:565766 0:596308 0:630215 0:697537
S.E. of regression 0:027094 0:053893 0:046768 0:025569 0:013821
AIC  4:281325  2:861028  3:099847  4:329306  5:618613
SIC  4:068176  2:632006  2:814374  4:089336  5:415864
N.B. Figures in brackets are the standard errors:
Table 4: Best Fitting ARMAs for UK Monetary Policy Regimes
Below the IRFs in Figure 1 we show  where the ARMA order is higher than AR(1)  the closest
AR(1) approximation (tted by OLS to the IRF) and also a table of the half-life. Summarising these
results, we nd very low persistence under Bretton Woods and again under Money Targeting5 and
Ination Targeting, but the two other regimes exhibit high persistence. We now turn to the specication
and calibration of the New Keynesian and New Classical models within each regime we have identied.
Half-Life
Bretton Woods 1
Incomes Policy 3
Money Targeting 1
Exchange Rate Targeting 2
Ination Targeting 1
Table 5: Half-Life of IRFs
4For the MT regime the ARMA(1,1), with AIC of  3:099847 and R2 of 0:596308, outperformed the ARMA(2,0), with
AIC of  2:777950 and R2 of 0:443009. We therefore chose it. Nevertheless we also examined later the ARMA(2,0) case
because it suggested much greater persistence for this regime.
5For Monetary Targeting the ARMA(2,0) case which is the next best estimate after the ARMA(1,1) used here suggested
by contrast high persistence. Because this is qualitatively so di¤erent we examine later from the perspective of robustness
how well each model manages to explain it.
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Function (Best-Fitting ARMA, and closest AR(1) representation)
3 Comparing Models and Data using the Bootstrap
3.1 The Structural Model  with New Keynesian or New Classical Phillips
curve
We now set up simple models with varying ination stickiness, derived from micro-foundations. In
doing this we follow the well-known methods used for example by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000)
and McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2000)  see Annex A for details in our case. Here we give a verbal
description of what we have done, with a summary of the resulting models. For simplicity we will
distinguish between sticky-price New Keynesianmodels, based on Calvo contracts and exible-price
New Classicalmodels with a simple one-quarter information lag. The root model is identical between
New Keynesian and New Classical, apart from the Phillips Curve and the information assumptions (there
is an information lag in the New Classical model only; this is needed to give monetary policy an e¤ect
on output within a exible price economy). Within the New Keynesian model we will distinguish in turn
between three degrees of ination stickiness: high (with a strong backward-looking element), medium
(where backward and forward-looking elements are of similar size) and low (where the forward-looking
element is dominant). All these models assume the high price rigidity of Calvo contracts but they di¤er
in terms of the stickiness of ination because of the backward-looking indexation component. Only the
New Classical model embodies complete price exibility, with just an information lag to give an element
of temporary rigidity.
In all the models the rst equation is the IS curve of the expectational variety that includes Etyt+1
as in Kerr and King (1996), McCallum and Nelson (1997, 1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
This optimising IS function can be regarded as a transformation of the structural consumption Euler
equation, with the market-clearing condition for output substituted into it; the error term captures
stochastic movements in government spending, exports etc. In the case of the two regimes treated here
as having a xed exchange rate  Bretton Woods and Exchange Rate Targeting  we have an additional
expenditure switching e¤ect (between the home and foreign goods) in the IS curve.
The second equation in the models is the New Keynesian or New Classical Phillips curve. The former
is derived from Calvo contract price-setting with the addition of backward-looking indexation. The
latter is the equation of a clearing labour market equating the marginal product of labour with the Euler
equation for labour supply, with a one-period information lag among households creating the ination
surprise term.
The last set of equations relate to monetary policy. The Euler equation for household choice of foreign
versus home bonds creates the equation of uncovered interest parity (UIP). Under xed exchange rates,
ination at home changes the real exchange rate and this feeds into net exports and the real interest rate
and so the IS curve. Under oating exchange rates the real exchange rate can be substituted out of the
IS curve in favour of the real interest rate. We may then identify two variants of monetary policy: one
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with monetary targeting and a demand for money, and one with direct setting of interest rates through
a Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor rule (ination targeting). There is also a regime without any monetary
policy, that of incomes policywhich we model directly with no input from our structural models here
otherwise.
3.1.1 Estimating the error processes
In each of the models we estimate the AR coe¢ cients (s) of the errors in the IS, Phillips Curve and,
where applicable, money supply/demand functions. As the solution itself is a function of the errors, we
iterate; we get a rst approximation of the errors by using the calibrated parameter values along with the
data in the IS/PP curve equation and for the expectational variables the values given by the solutions
lagged terms ignoring the errors. Once we have the shock data we run AR(1) on it, to get our rst
estimates of these s in the various models.
To work out the errors implied by the models and the data, we have used a rolling forecast programme.
The programme works as follows. Our rst estimates of the s enable it to work out the expectational
variables in the model conditional on lagged endogenous and projected exogenous variables6 Using the
expectational variables the model solves for the endogenous variables for the current period and all
periods in the future. The new error then is simply the di¤erence between the left hand side and right
hand side of the original equation where actual data is plugged in for current and lagged endogenous
variables and the expected terms are from the current rolling forecast. Then we estimate AR(1) on
these new errors to get the new s, which can then be used to work out the new expectational variables.
The model is then solved again to get the new endogenous variables and yet again a new set of errors.
This iterative procedure is repeated until the errors and s (hence also the expectations) approximately
converge.
3.2 The resulting small models
We derive the small models as discussed above; here we set out the equations that emerge and are used
for the bootstrapping exercise.
Fixed Exchange Rate model:
(IS)yt =  (Rt   Etpt+1 + pt) + Etyt+1 + xNXt + vFXt
where yt is detrended output,  = , NXt = (1 B 1) logCFt +(1 B 1) logQt; logQt = pFt pt,
Rt = RFt;R= nominal interest rate and p = log of consumer prices. The subscript FX on the error
denotes the regime.
Under Fixed rates the LM curve is redundant. The model is completed by a Phillips Curve, either
New Keynesian
t = (yt   y) + Ett+1 + (1  )t 1 + uKt
where t = pt; the K subscript on the error denotes New Keynesian.
or New Classical (subscript C)
yt = p
ue
t + uCt
where the ue superscript denotes unanticipated at t-1.
Floating Exchange rate model:
(IS)yt =  rt + Etyt+1 + xNXt + vFLt
where as above yt is detrended output,  = , NXt = (1   B 1) logCFt + (1   B 1) logQt, rt=
real interest rate; but now logQt = Et logQt+1 + rFt   rt.
Now again there is either a New Keynesian or New Classical Phillips curve as above.
Finally there are di¤ering regimes:
Either Incomes Policy:
(IP) t = (1  )t 1 + ct
Notice that in this regime the Incomes Policy equation bypasses the rest of the model,  representing
the toughnessof controls; needless to say such a control regime cannot be expected to last because it
6 In FUS and FGR the foreign interest rate, foreign GDP and foreign prices enter as exogenous variables and have
autoregressive processes estimated for them.
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could not indenitely override market forces in the rest of the model; the e¤ect of these is seen in the
error term ct. Nor does it of course, as the regime changes by the end of the decade.
Or Monetary Targeting
(MT) mt = m+ t
with LM Curve
(LM) mt   pt =  1Etyt+1    2Rt + et
where mt = logMt; pt = logPt:
Or Ination Targeting
(IT) Rt =  1(t   ) +  2Rt 1 + it
Notice here no LM curve is required.
Calibrated and Estimated Parameters of the Models:
For parameters in both models, we followed Orphanides (1998), Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland (1999),
McCallum and Nelson (1999a, 1999b), McCallum (2001), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Ball (1999)
and Batini and Haldane (1999). The actual parameters used were adjusted to achieve reasonable model
properties and so vary across models. In particular when the New Keynesian Phillips Curve is substituted
for the New Classical, there are now several (two or more) forward roots as well as at least one backward
root in each models characteristic equation; all must be stable in order for the model to have a stable
solution (see Minford and Peel, 2002, chapter 2). This requires numerical analysis: because of the
complexity of the equations, it is not possible to establish this analytically in any of these cases. We
therefore calibrated each model so that it satised this stability condition when subjected to simulation
analysis. In general we found this meant keeping the value , the forward-looking term in output in the
IS curve, somewhat below 1; we have varied it from 1 according to the demands of stability and this
in turn required a higher  to achieve and adequate long-run e¤ect of real interest rates on aggregate
demand.
New Classical New Keynesian
Parameter Calibrated Value
 0.1
 0.5
 0.2
 1
 0.2
 1 1.0
 2 0.15
 0.85
 1.5
Parameter Calibrated Value
 0.4; 0.3 (MT)
 0.2
 0.1 (FUS/FGR);0.17 (MT); 0.3 (IT)
 0.3/0.7 (FUS/FGR);0.4/0.7 (MT); 0.5/1.0 (IT)
 1 0.5
 2 0.2
 0.85
 1.5
 0.35(FUS);0.17(MT);0.1(FGR);0.3(IT)+
The rst value shown is that used for the high stickiness version. the second for the medium
and low stickiness versions.
+These values are those used for the high stickiness cases; for medium stickiness the value was 0.5,
for low stickiness 0.9 in all regimes.
Table 6: Calibrated Parameters
The value for , the forward-looking root in the Phillips Curve, is hotly disputed in recent empirical
work. Thus Rudd and Whelan (2005), found the backward element predominant in tting the ination
data at the single equation level and so set  close to zero. Gali et al. (2005) on the other hand argue on
the basis of their own instrumental variable estimation procedure that it should be close to unity. We
decided therefore to look at a range of values for .
The following two tables show the time-series parameters and variances used in bootstrapping the
errors; they are the errors implied by the models and the data, and are found as explained in the section
above on estimating the error processes.
The residual on interest rate setting in the ination targeting policy was not bootstrapped, thus
being treated as an exogenous process that would have been identical across all models and shocks 
perhaps related to other exogenous events such as oil price movements  and not treated as stochastic
policy shocks that could have followed a di¤erent pattern. The latter would suggest an arbitrariness of
policy choice which may be implausible. In this it di¤ers for example from money supply growth, where
developments beyond o¢ cial control will disturb money outcomes.
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New Classical
Regime Estimated AR(1) Parameters of errors
u v c  t
Fixed Exchange Rate: US 0:52 (0:000754) 0:72 (0:000262)
(FUS)
Incomes Policy (IP) 0:58 (0:000935)  0:06 (0:001576)  0:21 (0:004800)
Money Targeting (MT) 0:77 (0:000451) 0:81 (0:001662) 0:88 (0:004672)
Fixed Exchange Rate: 0:65 (0:001738) 0:72 (0:000770)
Germany (FGR)
Ination Targeting 0:89 (0:000019) 0:05 (0:000222)
(IT) RPI
Table 7: Estimated Parameters and Variances of Error Processes (NC Models) [Variances in parentheses]
New Keynesian
Regime Estimated AR(1) Parameters for errors
u v  t
Fixed Exchange Rate: US 0:97 (0:000682)  0:34 (0:001803)
(FUS)
Money Targeting (MT) 0:67 (0:004442) 0:08 (0:002706) 0:004 (1:192070)
Fixed Exchange Rate: 0:91 (0:001423)  0:73 (0:002829)
Germany (FGR)
Ination Targeting 0:50 (0:000159)  0:39 (0:001562)
(IT) RPI
Table 8: Estimated Parameters and Variances of Error Processes (NK Models) [Variances in parentheses]
4 Bootstrapping and the method of indirect inference
We now replicate the stochastic environment for each model-regime combination to see whether within
it our estimated ARMA equations could have been generated. This we do via bootstrapping the models
above with their error processes. Meenagh et al. (2008) explain how this procedure is derived from the
method of indirect inference. This method uses an auxiliary model to describe the data  such as
our time-series representation here  and estimates the parameters of the structural model of interest
as those under which this model can replicate the behaviour of the auxiliary model most accurately
according to a criterion of t, here the t to the ARMA parameters  see Smith (1993), Gregory
and Smith (1991, 1993), Gourieroux et al. (1993), Gourieroux and Monfort (1995) and Canova (2005).
The method can also be used to evaluate the t of a given model; in e¤ect this arrests the method
before estimation proceeds further. This is relevant as here, when we are interested in the behaviour of
structural models whose structure is rather precisely specied by theory.
The idea of this evaluation is to create pseudo data samples  here 1000  for ination. Within each
regime we draw the vectors of i:i:d: shocks in our error processes with replacement (so preserving any
cross-correlations between the shocks); we then input them into their error processes and these in turn
into the model to solve for the implied path of ination over the sample period. We then run ARMA
regressions (with constants and seasonals suppressed since the shocks have zero mean and no seasonality)
on all the pseudo-samples to derive the implied 95% condence intervals for all the coe¢ cient values
found. Finally we compare the ARMA coe¢ cients estimated from the actual data to see whether they
lie within these 95% condence intervals: under the null hypothesis of the model-regime being considered,
these values represent the sampling variation for the ARMA coe¢ cients. We also show a portmanteau
Wald statistic, the 95% condence limit for the joint distribution of the ARMA parameters  Table 9
summarises the results of this exercise. This bootstrap distribution of the ARMA parameters, hence of
persistence, is independent of the bootstrap variance of ination; thus we do not concern ourselves with
the extent to which the structural model replicates the variance of the ination data, as our interest here
is solely with persistence.
The Wald statistic is derived from the bootstrap distribution of the ARMA parameters under the
null hypothesis that the structural model holds. Thus the gures below show, for two parameters in the
auxiliary equation such as in an ARMA(1,1), the bootstrap distribution of the parameters under the
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Figure 2: Bivariate Normal Distributions (0.1, 0.9 shaded) with correlation of 0 and 0.9.
null, for two examples, one where the two parameter estimates are uncorrelated, the other where they
are highly correlated (0.9). One can think of estimation via indirect inference as changing the parameters
of the structural model, thus changing the implied distribution, so as to push the observed data point
as far into the centre of the distribution as possible. The test however takes the structural parameters
(and hence the bivariate distribution) as given and merely notes the position of the observed data point
(here given as 0.1 and 0.9) in the distribution. The Wald statistic is computed as this position expressed
as a percentile; thus a percentage for example of 96 indicates that the observed parameter estimates lie
on the 96% contour, i.e. in the 95% rejection region.
4.1 Results for the New Classical models:
It can be seen from Table 9 that the model is accepted as a whole (based on the Wald statistic) for all
regimes except for exchange rate targeting where the model falls well short of the estimated persistence.
We include the incomes policy regime here for information, though it is una¤ected by the di¤erent degrees
of rigidity and therefore does not gure in the later comparisons between models.
The charts that follow show the impulse response functions with their 95% condence intervals.
Ination persistence is fairly low under Bretton Woods; rises as it moves to a oating regime with
incomes policy and then falls back sharply under monetary targeting  this was the period of the
Thatcher governments monetaristpolicies designed to squeeze high double-digit ination out of the
economy. Finally persistence rose again under exchange rate targeting until ination targeting pushed it
back down to the Bretton Woods level. The model fails as we have seen to generate enough persistence
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Estimated 95% Condence Interval Wald
Lower Upper statistic
Bretton Woods AR(1)  0:592304  0:825237 0:930382 67:3
(FUS) MA(1) 0:952206  0:969678 1:296733
Incomes Policy AR(1) 0:727366 0:199370 0:737302 94:0
(IP)
Money Targeting AR(1) 0:927892  0:801210 0:968120 91:8
(MT) MA(1)  0:997381  0:997490 1:531400
Exchange Rate Targeting AR(1) 0:623726  0:222109 0:258290 100:0
(FGR)
Ination Targeting (RPI) AR(1) 0:202142  0:208337 0:294338 79:7
(IT)
Table 9: Condence Limits the New Classical Model for Theoretical ARMAs
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Figure 3: New Classical Impulse Response Functions with 95% Bounds
under exchange rate targeting but otherwise captures the shifts from low to high persistence and then
back again to low. As we have seen, this is not because the persistence of the exogenous shocks changes
across regimes but rather because the regimes themselves alter the response of ination to this persistence.
4.2 Results for the New Keynesian models:
We now turn to the New Keynesian versions of the model. In the following tables we show the equivalent
bootstrap results. We group them into three: high ination stickiness (low-), medium, and low ination
stickiness (high-):
4.2.1 High stickiness (low-:)
These results indicate that the high-stickiness New Keynesian version of the model is rejected for all
four regimes. As we saw earlier the NC version was only rejected for Exchange Rate Targeting. The
reason seems to be the high level of persistence in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve itself, which is
both forward-looking as in Calvo and also has a large backward-looking component. This Phillips Curve
was constructed to generate persistence: persistence is as it were engineered intothe ination process
through it. However, the consequent di¢ culty is that though policy regime changes do have some e¤ect
on the degree of persistence, this e¤ect is insu¢ cient to account for the data at least with the calibrations
usually used for policy and assumed here. Ination targeting brings it down materially compared with
the other regimes; but still nowhere near enough. By contrast, the New Classical model derives its
ination persistence properties from the autoregressive roots driving the errors as well as the monetary
regime to which it is highly sensitive. The monetary policy mechanism can either add further persistent
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errors or it can o¤set existing sources of persistence by reacting to an ination shock with a future
ination reduction (as for example under Ination targeting).
Estimated 95% Condence Interval Wald
Lower Upper statistic
Bretton Woods AR(1)  0:592304 0:651404 0:917036 100:0
(FUS) MA(1) 0:952206 0:014508 0:814515
Money Targeting AR(1) 0:927892 0:589790 0:972620 99:3
(MT) MA(1)  0:997381 0:001890 0:997420
Exchange Rate Targeting AR(1) 0:623726 0:803951 0:996775 100:0
(FGR)
Ination Targeting (RPI) AR(1) 0:202142 0:333518 0:685009 99:9
(IT)
Table 10: Condence Limits from the New Keynesian Model for Theoretical ARMAs
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Figure 4: New Keynesian Impulse Response Functions with 95% Bounds (high stickiness)
We can summarise the di¤erence as that persistence in the New Keynesian model is set by the
autoregressive roots essentially produced by the Phillips Curves persistence, which can with di¢ culty be
changed by the monetary regime whereas persistence in the New Classical model is set by the combination
of largely xed autoregressive roots coming from the exogenous processes and of a moving average process
much a¤ected by the monetary policy regime.
4.2.2 Medium stickiness (: is 0.5)
When the size of the backward-looking root is brought down to around 0.5, the models implications
are for substantially less persistence. This allows it to match the Exchange Rate Targeting regime well.
But although it gets closer to the persistence of the Monetary Targeting regime, it is still rejected and
is massively rejected for both Bretton Woods and Ination Targeting.
4.2.3 Low stickiness (:=0.9)
In this nal version of the New Keynesian model the Phillips Curve is virtually entirely forward-looking,
with the least ination stickiness of any of these Calvo contract models. The model now matches the
Money Targeting and Ination Targeting regimes but it is still too persistent for Bretton Woods and it
is now not persistent enough for the Exchange Rate Targeting regime.
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Estimated 95% Condence Interval Wald
Lower Upper statistic
Bretton Woods AR(1)  0:592304 0:255710 0:991510 100:0
(FUS) MA(1) 0:952206  0:971190 0:746510
Money Targeting AR(1) 0:927892 0:050886 0:906435 98:3
(MT) MA(1)  0:997381  0:580258 0:970441
Exchange Rate Targeting AR(1) 0:623726 0:523998 0:845061 63:6
(FGR)
Ination Targeting (RPI) AR(1) 0:202142 0:596853 0:819715 100:0
(IT)
Table 11: Condence Limits from the New Keynesian Model for Theoretical ARMAs
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Figure 5: New Keynesian Impulse Response Functions with 95% Bounds (medium stickiness)
4.3 Comparing the models
The New Keynesian model in its most sticky form generates far too much persistence in all regimes.
As the backward-looking root is brought down, it is able to encompass up to two of the regimes only.
The persistence features in each case are a¤ected by both the Phillips Curve and the regime itself.
The gures below illustrate this for the deterministic IRFs of a supply shock (to the Phillips curve)
with an AR(1) coe¢ cient of 0.6. It can be seen for example that under xed rates for example the
high-stickiness case yields extreme persistence but that under strict ination targeting with a doubled
Taylor Rule coe¢ cient on ination (ITx2) persistence is greatly reduced. With the New Classical model
where the Phillips Curve itself has merely a one-period information lag, the persistence properties come
from the natural autoregressiveness of the errors interacting with the regime. As the regime varies the
basic autoregressiveness due to the errors is modied by the regimes responses; this enables the model
to encompass most of the variation in persistence across regimes. Again the gures below show how
peristence is reduced as one moves from xed rates to ITx2.
If we ask which model version is the most likely, we can measure this by an overall likelihood. In each
regime the likelihood of observing the data-generated ARMA parameters, under the null of each model,
can be computed from the models probability density function (we assume this is multi-variate normal
by appealling to the central limit theorem since these parameters are sample means). The natural logs
of these pdfs are shown in Table 13 together with the sum across all regimes for each model. This last
gure represents the log of the joint likelihood.
The Table shows that for all the regimes other than for exchange rate targeting the model with least
stickiness, the New Classical, is the most likely. This model is also the most likely overall. The various
New Keynesian models perform poorly: the medium stickiness New Keynesian model is the next most
likely but it is rejected in three out of the four regimes.
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Estimated 95% Condence Interval Wald
Lower Upper statistic
Bretton Woods AR(1)  0:592304 0:853110 0:983040 100:0
(FUS) MA(1) 0:952206  0:997490  0:42105
Money Targeting AR(1) 0:927892 0:191180 0:932391 77:3
(MT) MA(1)  0:997381  0:93970 0:633995
Exchange Rate Targeting AR(1) 0:623726  0:274871 0:407777 100:0
(FGR)
Ination Targeting (RPI) AR(1) 0:202142  0:247884 0:566936 63:5
(IT)
Table 12: Condence Limits from the New Keynesian Model for Theoretical ARMAs
FUS (IRF)
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45
ACTUAL LOWER UPPER
IT_RPI (IRF)
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45
ACTUAL LOWER UPPER
MT (IRF)
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45
ACTUAL LOWER UPPER
FGR (IRF)
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45
ACTUAL LOWER UPPER
Figure 6: New Keynesian Impulse Response Functions with 95% Bounds (low stickiness)
We also look at several robustness tests (Annex C for full details). First, we examined the possibility
that the monetary regime ination behaviour was better captured by an AR(2) than the ARMA(1,1) we
assumed; though the last ts better the other is close and yields a much higher estimate of persistence.
Second, we looked at the case where the interest elasticity of the demand for money was much higher
(ten times) than we assumed as is sometimes found. In both these cases the superiority of the New
Classical model was enhanced.
Third we looked at the alternative break dates estimated with the Qu-Perron test. In this case we
found a change in the ranking (see next table): the low stickiness version of the New Keynesian model
did marginally better with these breaks than the New Classical. Both these models with slight ination
stickiness still dominate the other much more sticky New Keynesian models which are both rejected in
three out of four regimes.
Targeting Regimes
Bretton Woods Monetary Exchange Rate Ination Total
New Keynesian
High Stickiness  82:71  17:94  6:50  2:16  109:31 ( 26:6)+
Medium Stickiness  32:16  10:48 0:86  9:91  51:69 ( 19:53)+
Low Stickiness  1  0:79  19:10 0:33  1 ( 19:56)+
New Classical  2:69  6:44  7:12 0:45  15:8 ( 13:11)+
+Numbers in parentheses correspond to the total for the last three regimes
Table 13: Log-likelihood of Observing the Data-Generated ARMA Parameters Under Each Model and
Regime
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Figure 7: Ination impulse response functions for a supply shock (AR=0.6) by model and regime-
Fix=FUS,FGR; ITx2=IT but with coe¢ cient on ination doubled.
Targeting Regimes
Bretton Woods Monetary Exchange Rate Ination Total
New Keynesian
High Stickiness -27.76 -3.41 -28.28  2:16  61:62
Medium Stickiness -5.65 -3.16 -9.86  9:91  28:58
Low Stickiness -8.56 -7.12 -1.08 0:33  16:43
New Classical -0.35 -5.84 -14.64 0:45  20:38
Table 14: Qu-Perron breaks: Log-likelihood of Observing the Data-Generated ARMA Parameters Under
Each Model and Regime
Finally, we looked at an alternative time-series equation for ination estimated by Boero et al. (2008).
While the resulting estimates of persistence di¤ered in detail from ours, it remained the case that the
same two models with low stickiness dominated, again with our original breaks marginally favouring the
New Classical and the Qu-Perron breaks marginally favouring the low-stickiness New Keynesian.
Thus our basic nding that models with low stickiness account for the data the best by a large margin
remains robust.
5 Conclusions
UK ination persistence varies strikingly across the many monetary regimes pursued in the UK during
the postwar period. It started low under Bretton Woods, then rose sharply during the next decade as the
exchange rate oated without a monetary anchor, fell to virtually nil under the succeeding monetarist
regime of the 1980s, before rising again to a high level when the pound was tied to the Deutschemark;
nally on the introduction of ination targeting from 1992 ination persistence dropped back again to
the level last seen under Bretton Woods. These facts cannot be accounted for easily by models of nominal
rigidity of the sort modelled in Calvo contracts with a medium to large element of lagged indexation.
These models build a large degree of persistence into the Phillips Curve and this degree of persistence
is not su¢ ciently sensitive to variations in the monetary regime to match the variation of persistence
revealed in the facts. By contrast a model with minimal rigidity, such as the exprice model with a
one-quarter information lag, New Classicalin nature, or the New Keynesian with low stickiness (a very
low lagged coe¢ cient) have generally better success in picking up these variations. These models rely
for ination persistence more on the autoregressiveness of the error processes themselves, with di¤erent
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monetary regimes moderating this natural persistence more or less. We conclude in short that ination
persistence is not a constant resulting from the inherent nominal stickiness of the monetary transmission
process, but is rather the product of monetary policy interacting with the natural autoregressiveness
of exogenous processes and is best captured by models with little nominal stickiness. Of course this
leaves various possible future lines of research open. One is whether there is some mechanism that could
suitably alter the parameters of the models as monetary regimes change, especially the exogenously
imposed degree of stickiness in the New Keynesian models (Gertler and Leahy, 2008, for example make
pricing depend on the productivity state). Another is whether these models can also successfully address
other macroeconomic regularities. We hope merely to have established in a Popperian way a negative
nding: namely that the facts of UK ination persistence strongly reject widely-used models with a
substantial (xed) degree of ination stickiness.
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Annex A A final robustness test
In the period since we wrote this paper we developed improvements in our methods for testing under
Indirect Inference. Thus we wished to establish whether our results would be robust to implementing
these, as well as some other more minor changes in method.
The changes concerned were as follows:
1) in estimating the structural errors in each model we used the model to generate the expectations
wherever these entered. This method is an iterative one since the expectations depend importantly on
the autoregressive coefficients of the errors, while these coefficients in turn depend on the errors that are
generated. We decided that a superior method was to use the robust estimation procedure suggested by
McCallum (1976) and Wickens (1982) in which the expectations are generated by instrumental variable
regressions; as instruments we used the lagged values of the data, so that we used a VAR(1) of output,
inflation and interest rates to generate the estimated expectations used in estimating the structural
errors.
2) in bootstrapping the shocks we chose a random set of shocks for the current and next five quarters
for each period; for the following period, the resulting lagged values from this simulation were used in
conjunction with another drawing of six current and future shocks; and so on until the whole bootstrap of
overlapping shocks was completed. Thus agents are obtaining in each period new information about the
shocks, not merely for the current quarter but also for succeeding quarters. This is how many forecasts
are constructed, with an interpretation each quarter of the whole pattern of current and future shocks.
A simpler alternative which we now normally use is to shock only the current quarter.
3) we check explicitly for any roots on or outside the unit circle in the AR or MA coefficients of
the bootstrap regressions; any bootstrap regressions where the roots are not inside the unit circle are
discarded from the bootstrap distribution as providing no information1 .
When we implement these changes we find that out of the New Classical and the low-persistence
New Keynesian that were the dominant models in our previous results, only the New Classical survives
as a credible explanation of inflation persistence, even though it still fails to replicate the behaviour of
the Exchange Rate targeting regime. The New Keynesian models generate excessive persistence in all
regimes whatever their degree of stickiness. The Impulse Response Functions and their 95% bounds are
shown below for all models/ regimes; they show clearly how the NK regimes all overpredict persistence.
Thus our conclusion remains that inflation persistence depends essentially on the monetary regime and
the persistence of exogenous shocks, rather than on some inherent persistence produced by stickiness in
the Phillips Curve.
1We ended up with the following number of bootstraps for each regime:
NC NK High NK Medium NK Low
FUS 727 885 595 469
MT 1000 969 918 800
FGR 1000 511 766 641
SIT 929 983 941 717
The alternative to excluding the ARMAs from these bootstraps would have been to use constrained Maximum Likelihood
estimation throughout, constraining the roots to be inside the unit circle. However that lay beyond our scope here.
1
A.1 Results for the New Classical models:
Estimated 95% Confidence Interval Wald
Lower Upper statistic
Bretton Woods AR(1) −0.582286 −0.928188 0.999054 99.0
(FUS) MA(1) 0.953580 −0.997443 0.978302
Incomes Policy AR(1) 0.735372 0.427389 0.854566 42.0
(IP)
Money Targeting AR(1) 0.343938 0.068618 0.710834 75.3
(MT) AR(2) 0.375406 −0.267597 0.471731
Exchange Rate Targeting AR(1) 0.641620 0.340258 0.434509 100.0
(FGR)
Inflation Targeting (RPI) AR(1) −0.669711 −0.334630 1.255148 94.0
(IT) AR(2) 0.312549 −0.622034 0.473081
MA(1) 0.985220 −0.979062 0.997391
Table 1: Confidence Limits the New Classical Model for Theoretical ARMAs
A.2 Results for the New Keynesian models:
A.2.1 High stickiness (low-ν:)
Estimated 95% Confidence Interval Wald
Lower Upper statistic
Bretton Woods AR(1) −0.582286 0.959540 0.998876 100.0
(FUS) MA(1) 0.953580 −0.064583 0.669371
Money Targeting AR(1) 0.343938 1.410441 1.860496 100.0
(MT) AR(2) 0.375406 −0.957609 −0.425155
Exchange Rate Targeting AR(1) 0.641620 0.972970 0.999088 100.0
(FGR)
Inflation Targeting (RPI) AR(1) −0.669711 −0.070916 1.560340 100.0
(IT) AR(2) 0.312549 −0.694673 0.847232
MA(1) 0.985220 −0.569893 0.966081
Table 2: Confidence Limits from the New Keynesian Model for Theoretical ARMAs
A.2.2 Medium stickiness (ν: is 0.5)
Estimated 95% Confidence Interval Wald
Lower Upper statistic
Bretton Woods AR(1) −0.582286 0.992301 1.003105 100.0
(FUS) MA(1) 0.953580 −1.318379 0.086075
Money Targeting AR(1) 0.343938 1.005464 1.656545 100.0
(MT) AR(2) 0.375406 −0.692355 −0.018083
Exchange Rate Targeting AR(1) 0.641620 0.974883 1.047992 100.0
(FGR)
Inflation Targeting (RPI) AR(1) −0.669711 −0.124747 1.459610 100.0
(IT) AR(2) 0.312549 −0.656741 0.841686
MA(1) 0.985220 −0.945823 0.974431
Table 3: Confidence Limits from the New Keynesian Model for Theoretical ARMAs
2
A.2.3 Low stickiness (ν:=0.9)
Estimated 95% Confidence Interval Wald
Lower Upper statistic
Bretton Woods AR(1) −0.582286 0.998736 0.999978 100.0
(FUS) MA(1) 0.953580 −0.997468 −0.938055
Money Targeting AR(1) 0.343938 0.590426 1.296314 100.0
(MT) AR(2) 0.375406 −0.308719 0.404206
Exchange Rate Targeting AR(1) 0.641620 0.985248 0.999757 100.0
(FGR)
Inflation Targeting (RPI) AR(1) −0.669711 −0.169801 1.301428 100.0
(IT) AR(2) 0.312549 −0.407000 0.807397
MA(1) 0.985220 −0.948954 0.997264
Table 4: Confidence Limits from the New Keynesian Model for Theoretical ARMAs
A.3 Comparing the models
Targeting Regimes
Bretton Woods Monetary Exchange Rate Inflation Total
New Keynesian
High Stickiness −∞ −245.47 −∞ −381.57 −∞
Medium Stickiness −∞ −283.44 −∞ −96.41 −∞
Low Stickiness −∞ −204.85 −∞ −37.88 −∞
New Classical −6.75 0.55 −56.78 −3.34 −66.32
Table 5: Log-likelihood of Observing the Data-Generated ARMA Parameters Under Each Model and
Regime
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Figure 1: IRFs of ARMAs with 95% bounds
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